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The quantity sold on the foreign market is instead
qrs(prs) = qLrs(prs)
L
2
+ qHrs(prs)(1− λr)H (10)
Similar expressions can be obtained for firms that produce in region s.
Operating profits of a representative firm which produces in r are obtained by adding oper-
ating profits which derive from sales in r, πrr, to those derived from sales in s, πrs, which are,
respectively,
πrr = prrqrr and πrs = (prs − t) qrs (11)
The production cost of each firm in region z = r, s is generated by the fixed cost that firms have
to sustain in order to employ f skilled workers and are given by
TCr = fwr (12)
Therefore, pure profits πr of the representative firm which produces in region r are
πr = πrr + πrs − fwr (13)
Finally, the assumption of full employment of workers implies that
Hr = λrH = nrf and Hs = (1− λr)H = nsf (14)
3 Preference differences and equilibrium outcomes
In this section we derive equilibrium prices and quantities and skilled workers’ indirect utility
functions used to evaluate the stability properties of the different potential outcomes. First of all,
from the first order conditions for the maximization of profits, we obtain the following equilibrium
price for varieties sold at home
p∗zz(λz, ρ) =
tdL
¡L
2 + ρλzH
¢
(1− λz)M + 2a
¡L
2 + λzH
¢
2 (2bL + dLM)
¡L
2 + ρλzH
¢ (15)
where z = r, s. The asterisk always denotes equilibrium values.
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Moreover, the price of exported varieties from region z to region v is
p∗zv(λz, ρ) = p∗vv +
t
2
(16)
where v, z = r, s and v 6= z. From the previous expression we note that, even though prices
differ from the original linear core-periphery model by Ottaviano et. al. (2002), the relationship
between prices of locally produced varieties, pvv, and the imported varieties, pzv, is still the one
found in the linear model.
In order to have positive exports from region z to region v, exporting prices, p∗zv, must be
higher than transport costs, t, and this requires that
t < t∗zv =
2a (L+ 2H)
(2bL + dLM) (L+ 2ρH)
(17)
where v, z = r, s and v 6= z.
It can be easily verified from (15) and (16) that
∂p∗zr(λr, ρ)
∂ρ
< 0 (18)
with z = r, s. The result in (18) reflects the fact that when skilled workers’ preference for the
manufactured good and the variety in its consumption increase, that is when ρ decreases, the price
of each variety, either locally produced or imported, increases.
Moreover, we obtain that
∂p∗zr(λr, ρ)
∂λr
=
1
2(2bL + dLM)
·
−dLMt+
4LaH(1− ρ)
(L+ 2λrHρ)2
¸
(19)
with z = r, s. Thus, we may notice that, as in Ottaviano et al. (2002), equilibrium prices are
dependent on the distribution of the workers’ demand and firms between the two regions. However,
while Ottaviano et al. (2002, p. 417) find that "the prices charged by both local and foreign firms
fall when the mass of local firms increases (because price competition is fiercer)", we find that this
is true only when ρ ≥ 1, that is, when skilled workers have a weaker preference for the modern
good and variety in the consumption of the same. Thus, prices charged by both local and foreign
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firms are not obliged to fall whenever the mass of local firms increases, because expression (19)
shows that if the intensity of skilled workers’ preference for the modern good and its variety is
stronger (with ρ < 1), prices charged by firms, either local or foreign, may even increase when
the mass of local firms increases. This result arises in our work from the fact that, together with
the competition effect on prices generated by changes in the distribution of workers and firms,
already described in Ottaviano et al. (2002), there is another contextual effect on prices due to
preference heterogeneity which acts through the change in the relative weight of demand for the
modern goods with respect to the traditional good. We call this effect the preference effect and
its action will be more deeply discussed in next section.
Another new and significant result, strictly associated with the previous one, is that the increase
of the mass of local firms in a region, for instance region r, is no longer always associated with an
increase of the price of varieties sold in the other region, as it happens when ρ = 1. In fact, given
that
∂p∗zs(λr, ρ)
∂λr
=
1
2(2bL + dLM)
·
dLMt−
4LaH(1− ρ)
(L+ 2(1− λr)Hρ)2
¸
(20)
with z = r, s, it is easily verified that if skilled workers have a stronger preference for the modern
good and variety in its consumption, that is if ρ < 1, then an increase of the mass of local firms
in region r may also be associated with a decrease in prices of varieties sold in the other region s.
Moreover, we derive the equilibrium quantities which depend not only on the distribution of
firms and workers between the two regions, but also on the value of ρ. Particularly, for any firm
the equilibrium value of the quantity sold in the home region is
q∗zz(λz, ρ) =
(bL + dLM) [tdLM (1− λz) (L+ 2ρλzH) + 2a(L+ 2λzH)]
4(2bL + dLM)
(21)
where z = r, s. We also compute the equilibrium value of the quantity that any firm in v sells
abroad, that is
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q∗vz(λz, ρ) = q∗zz(λz, ρ)−
t(bL + dLM)(L+ 2ρ (1− λz)H)
4
(22)
where v, z = r, s and v 6= z.
It can be readily verified from (21) and (22) that
∂q∗zz(λz, ρ)
∂ρ
> 0 and ∂q
∗
vz(λz, ρ)
∂ρ
< 0 (23)
where v, z = r, s and v 6= z. Therefore, a reduction in ρ, due to an increase in the preference for
the manufactured good and the variety in its consumption for skilled workers, does always reduce
equilibrium quantities of locally produced varieties, and increase those of imported varieties.
We notice from (23) and (8) we can derive that
q∗zz(λz, ρ) > a and q∗vz(λz, ρ) < a (24)
with v, z = r, s and v 6= z.
Skilled workers’ indirect utility function in region r is given by the following expression
VHr(λr, ρ) = SHr(λr, ρ) + w∗r(λr, ρ) + q0 (25)
where the individual consumer surplus for skilled workers, SHr(λr, ρ), is given by
SHr(λr, ρ) =
a2M
2bH
− a [nr(λr, ρ)p∗rr(λr, ρ) + ns(λr, ρ)p∗sr(λr, ρ)] + (26)
+
bH + dHM
2
£
nr(λr, ρ)(p∗rr(λr, ρ))2 + ns(λr, ρ)(p∗sr(λr, ρ))2
¤
+
−dH
2
[nr(λr, ρ)p∗rr(λr, ρ) + ns(λr, ρ)p∗sr(λr, ρ)]
2
and the equilibrium skilled wage in region r, w∗r(λr, ρ), is derived from the free entry condition,
which implies that profits in (13) are equal to zero in equilibrium.
We follow the myopic adjustment process adopted in Ottaviano et al. (2002), from which we
know that a spatial equilibrium corresponds to the case in which each mobile worker located in
a region cannot increase its utility level by moving to the other region. Therefore, we may write
that a spatial equilibrium arises at an interior point, with λr ∈ (0, 1), when
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∆VH(λr, ρ) ≡ VHr(λr, ρ)− VHs(λr, ρ) = 0 (27)
or at the extreme point of full agglomeration in region s with λr = 0 (in region r with λr = 1)
when ∆VH(0, ρ) ≤ 0 (∆VH(1, ρ) ≥ 0).8
Finally, while it is easily verified that the agglomerated equilibria are always stable, the interior
equilibria are stable when the slope of ∆VH(λr, ρ) is negative.9
The indirect utility differential is
∆VH(λr, ρ) =
(2λr − 1)M
(2bL + dLM)2
£
(bL + dLM) (a0t2 + b0t) + c0
¤
(28)
where the three coefficients a0, b0 and c0, respectively, are
a0(ρ) = − (L+Hρ)d
2
LM
2+2(3Hρ+L)bLdLM+6b2LHρ
4H < 0 (29)
b0(λr, ρ) =
a



2(L+ 2λrHρ)[L+ 2(1− λr)Hρ]dLM+
+[(4− ρ)L2+2(4− ρ)ρHL+ 12(1− λr)λrH2ρ2]bL



[L+2(1−λr)Hρ](L+2λrHρ)
c0(λr, ρ) = −
2a2HL(1−ρ)



[L+ 2(1− λr)Hρ](L+ 2λrHρ)dLM+
+[(2− ρ)L2+(3− ρ)ρHL+ 4(1− λr)λrH2ρ2]bL



[L+2(1−λr)Hρ]2(L+2λrHρ)2
We observe that we obtain the results in the linear core periphery model by Ottaviano et al.
(2002) when ρ = 1. In this particular case, c0 = 0. We also note that when ρ < 1, it is always
true that b0 > 0 and c0 < 0.
In table 1 we compare the case in the linear core periphery model (ρ = 1) to our extension
(ρ > 0) and we draw the attention to the fact that in the latter case a0 depends only on ρ, while b0
and c0 depend both on ρ and λr, while in the former case no coefficients depend on the distribution
of skilled workers.
8 See Ottaviano et. al. (2002)
9 The reader interested in the specification of the migration process may find its accurate description in Ottaviano
et al (2002, p. 419).
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a0 b0 c0
ρ > 0 a0(ρ)
b0(λr, ρ) with
b0(0, ρ) = b0(1, ρ)
c0(λr, ρ) with
c0(0, ρ) = c0(1, ρ)
ρ = 1 a0= − (L+H)d
2
LM
2+2(3H+L)bLdLM+6b
2
LH
4H b0= a(3bL+2dLM) 0
Table 1.
Fig. 2 plots the indirect utility differential ∆VH(λr, ρ) when ρ < 1 and shows not only that
agglomeration may result unstable for parameter values for which it was stable with ρ = 1,
but also that asymmetric stable equilibria outcomes may arise when the symmetric equilibrium is
unstable. In fact, when ρ < 1 there is another dispersion force at work which acts together with all
traditional forces in determining the equilibria of the model. In particular, this force arises because
in the region with the highest (lowest) density of workers, prices tend to increase (decrease) due to
the stronger (weaker) demand for the differentiated good compared with that for the traditional
good, and it accompanies the agglomeration competition effect on prices which tend to decrease
(increase) in the same region because of the fiercer (weaker) competition originated by the greater
(smaller) number of firms.
Insert figure 2 about here
Finally, we note that when ρ < 1, the indirect utility differential in (28) at λr = 1 depends
on the the values of a0(ρ) < 0, b0(1, ρ) > 0 and c0(1, ρ) < 0.10 Clearly, the expression in square
brackets in (28) depends on the level of economic integration. More precisely, it is a concave
parabola in t, with its maximum for t1 = −b0(1, ρ)/(2a0(ρ)) > 0. Hence, given that the sign
of ∆VH(1, ρ) depends on that of the parabola, we can state that full agglomeration is never a
potential equilibrium for high and low trade costs, while it may be an equilibrium for intermediate
10 In particular, b0(1, ρ) = a [(4− ρ) bL + 2MdL] > 0 and c0(1, ρ) =
−2Ha2 (1−ρ)[(2−ρ)LbL+(3−ρ)ρHbL+(L+2Hρ)MdL]
(L+2Hρ)2 < 0.
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trade costs.11 In any case, we note that in the previous phrase we used the word potential to
qualify the equilibrium, because we remember that trade costs must be compatible to positive
prices and quantities, which require expression (17) to be satisfied.
On the other hand, when λr = 1/2 the indirect utility differential in (28) is decreasing in λr,
and therefore we have an equilibrium at λr = 1/2 only when
∂ (∆VH(λr, ρ))
∂λr
¯¯¯¯
λr=1/2
=
2M
£
(bL + dLM) (a0(ρ)t2 + b0(1/2, ρ)t) + c0(1/2, ρ)
¤
(2bL + dLM)2
< 0
Clearly, the previous inequality is true when the expression in square brackets is negative. We
observe that, when ρ < 1, this expression is depicted by a concave parabola in t with a0(ρ) < 0,
b0(0.5, ρ) > 0 and c0(0.5, ρ) < 0. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium is stable only for high and low
trade costs, provided that (17) is satisfied, while it is unstable for intermediate trade cost values.12
4 The competition effect and the preference effect in detail
In order to more deeply discuss the findings in the previous section, we recall that Ottaviano et
al. (2002) find that there are different effects which give rise to the agglomeration and dispersion
forces, whose interplay defines the properties of the equilibrium outcomes. These forces are the
dispersion force originated by the demand of immobile unskilled workers, and the agglomeration
force originated from the fact that a greater number of firms in a region implies that fewer varieties
are imported, and that equilibrium prices of all varieties sold in this region are smaller (competition
effect on prices).
In this work, we show that these effects are partially modified and enriched by the additional
force which is generated when ρ 6= 1. In particular, the centrifugal force generated by immobile
11 In particular, with ρ < 1, when λr = 1 and t = t∗, we know that ∆VH(1, ρ) > 0 if b0(1, ρ)2 > 4a0(ρ)c0(1,ρ)(bL+dLM) .
12 In particular, b0(0.5, ρ) = 2adLM +
a[(4−ρ)L(L+2ρH)+3H2ρ2]bL
(L+Hρ)2 and c0(0.5, ρ) = −2a
2H(1 −
ρ)
?
(L+Hρ)dLM + [ ((2− ρ)L+ (3− ρ)ρH)L+H2ρ2]bL
?
L 1
(L+Hρ)4
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